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Abstract
This research aims to extend the understanding of supply chain resiliency by
utilizing a simulation model of a U.S. Air Force aircraft engine repair network to
evaluate the degree of resiliency built into the system. The study compares the
recovery time of the disrupted current system to that of a fully-integrated repair
network; the objective being the quantification of resiliency in the current networks
design and gauging the effectiveness of various strategies in reducing recovery time.
This contributes to current literature by bridging the explicit gap on how to quantify,
measure, and compare resilient supply chain strategies and also provides an objective
means for basing managerial decisions.
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RESILIENT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CONSTRUCTS: ENHANCING
REPAIR NETWORK DESIGNS TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE RISKS AND
SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS
I. Introduction
The line between disorder and order lies in logistics...
–Sun Tzu
The goal of maximizing profits and reducing costs have moved many firms and
organizations to increase asset utilization and centralize operations in order to achieve
greater economies of scale [2]. However, these efficiencies can come at the cost of the
inability of an organization to effectively respond to and recover from disruptions [2].
As these networks become increasingly complex, firms and organizations experience
growing degrees of turbulence, creating the potential for unpredictable disruptions
[7]. Traditional risk management approaches are limited in their ability to deal with
unforeseeable events, however, supply chain resiliency strategies can fill many of these
gaps and create competitive advantage [7].
The purpose of this research is to develop a quantitative measure to gauge the
degree to which resiliency is built into a network. The specific metrics utilized to
compare variations in the design of a network include recovery time and disruption
severity (as its impact upon performance). In order to explore the relationship be-
tween network design and proposed resilient strategies, the F110-100 aircraft engine
repair network in the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) theater was selected as the basis
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for the model. This repair network was selected based upon the recommendation of
decision makers at the Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC). It is also important
to note that the resource levels allocated to each node and the various distributions
associated with asset repair do not reflect real-world capabilities in order to preserve
the operational security of U.S. military forces in the region.
1.1 Problem Statement
Decision makers at the AFSC need to know: (1) the degree of vulnerability that
the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network construct is to disruptions, (2) how long
it would take to resume steady-state operations following an unexpected, disruptive
event, and (3) what strategies can be employed in order to reduce both the severity of
a disruption and the time it takes to recover from it. By identifying how long and to
what degree a disruption would affect the repair networks capabilities, this research
seeks to assist those decision makers in minimizing the impact and recovery time of
repair network disruptions.
1.2 Research Questions
1. How severe of an impact would an unexpected disruption have upon the F110-
100 aircraft engine repair network in PACAF?
2. How long would it take for the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network in
PACAF to resume steady-state operations following an unexpected, disruptive event?
3. What network design strategies can be employed in order to reduce both the
severity of a disruption and the time it takes to recover from it?
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1.3 Investigative Questions
To answer the research question, the following investigative questions (IQ) will
need to be answered:
IQ1. What is the current layout and design of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair
network in PACAF?
IQ2. To what degree is the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network integrated and
how well is capacity being efficiently utilized laterally between nodes?
IQ3. What data is needed to simulate the current and integrated states of the
F110-100 aircraft engine repair network?
IQ4. What databases contain the data required to simulate the current and inte-
grated states of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network?
IQ5. What effects does the integration of repair facilities have upon the overall
number of spare engines available to the system?
IQ6. How long does it take for the current and integrated states of the F110-100
aircraft engine repair network to recover from a disruption?
IQ7. Does the integration of repair facilities mitigate the severity of a disruption
upon the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network?
1.4 Background
The vast geographical separation of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) bases from De-
pot maintenance facilities located within the continental United States, makes their
aircraft repair networks more susceptible to disruptions than that of stateside bases.
This susceptibility is due to the increased time that is required in order to ship parts
and equipment between the two regions, as compared to intra-regional transportation
times. In response to this higher degree of risk, the Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) stood up the 525th Electronics Maintenance Squadron (Support Center Pa-
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cific) at Kadena Airbase, Japan. The organization serves as a supplementary source
of depot repair for nine weapon systems and pro-actively supports the AFMC mission
by rapidly repairing 175 national stock number items, in addition to manufacturing
new resources. Performing this work in theater significantly reduces turnaround times
of critical assets by eliminating the shipping times required to get them back and forth
from the United States. Despite the added capabilities provided by the Support Cen-
ter Pacific (SCP), due to factors such as separate chains of command, decision makers
at PACAF are unable to influence the flow of parts and the prioritization of repair
for items at the SCP.
Another factor, which precludes the flexible and agile shifting of resources in order
to meet varying requirements and capacity constraints at the depot echelon, is the
Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) process. According to Air Force Instruction (AFI)
63-101, the DSOR process is the method by which the DoD postures its depot level
maintenance workloads as organic, contract, or a combination of both. It applies to
workloads for hardware, software, new acquisitions, and fielded systems for both Gov-
ernment and private contractor managed systems or subsystems [8]. Since the SCP is
a sub-organization of the Ogden Air Logistics Center (ALC), the parent organization
(309th EMXG) is able to shift the capacities and capabilities that are allocated to
it through the DSOR process to the SCP. However, if PACAF requires depot-level
repair capabilities that are allocated to a different ALC, the 309th EMXG cannot
shift resources to the SCP in order to begin performing the required function without
a change to the current DSOR. This time consuming and politically charged process
thus hinders the ability to fully optimize and integrate the repair network in order to
provide maximum support to the PACAF mission.
The amalgamation of all of these aforementioned issues and barriers highlights
the overarching problem as to whether or not the current overall repair network
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construct and its associated processes provide enough resilience. Resiliency is needed
to ensure that organizational objectives will be met, within an acceptable amount
of recovery time, in the event of an unforeseen disruption. Having recognized the
need to maximize responsiveness, agility and operational effectiveness, the Air Force
Chief of Staff approved the Repair Network Integration (RNI) initiative in the Fall of
2008 with the intent of transitioning the Air Force from the concept of multiple levels
of repair operating within MAJCOMs and the ANG, to an enterprise of all Non-
Mission Generating maintenance organized to optimize support to the Warfighter [1].
The initiatives foremost responsibility is to design repair networks that leverage the
similar repair capabilities of bases that utilize the same type of weapon systems and
components. Such a design allows the network to harness the full capacity of the Total
Force system and maximize support to mission-generating units, as demonstrated in
Figure 1. In order to facilitate such an undertaking, an organization was founded
under AFMC and staffed by members from various MAJCOMs with the sole onus
of executing the RNI concept. This RNI team itself has no direct authority over the
repair network nodes themselves, but rather acts as a liaison to collaborate among
all stakeholders to meet the enterprises needs. In other words, RNI does not replace
the chain of command, but rather creates a matrixed team to facilitate more rapid
stakeholder communications across organizations to quickly resolve repair constraints
[1].
Although the RNI concept sets the foundation to capitalize upon the potential
for increased throughput, agile response to changing mission needs, and an overall
increase in operational effectiveness given limited resources [1], its benefits are limited
to a single situation as it lacks the authority to modify the repair network construct
and ensure long-term optimization. Similar convolution and disjointedness in the Air
Forces supply chain construct led to the creation of the Supply Chain Operations
5
Figure 1. RNI construct [1]
Wing (SCOW), which eliminated the need to contact multiple organizations in order
to solve a supply-related issue and instead acted as the single focal point for the
customer [9]. In order to leverage similar benefits in the design of the RNI construct,
the Repair Network Manager (RNM) positions have also been aligned within the
SCOW. However, it is important to note that the SCOW does not possess chain of
command authority over the nodes and networks in which it is seeking to optimize,
thereby limiting its impact in terms of effectiveness and endurance. This is not to
say that the RNI concept is ineffectual (it is in fact the opposite), but rather that
there is a larger fundamental need to optimize repair network designs and processes
in order to meet the enterprise repair network vision.
As of October 2016, three Product Repair Groups (PRGs) have reached full oper-
ation capability under the RNI initiative: Propulsion, Precision Measurement Equip-
ment Labs (PMEL), and most recently, Hydraulic component repair [10]. The hy-
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draulic component repair group, when created, not only established the integration
of its particular repair network, but also encompassed the centralization of repair fa-
cilities. Specifically, repair actions shifted from 12 backshops to 5 Centralized Repair
Facilities (CRFs) and despite the reduction of backshops and recapitalization of 69
maintenance positions, the data shows CRFs and CRF supported bases sustained the
same, if not more, repair volume during this period [10]. Although the metrics pre-
sented by Chevalier [10] suggest that hydraulic component repair actually improved,
identifying the degree to which those improvements were generated from the integra-
tion of the repair network, its consolidation, or a combination thereof, is difficult to
determine. Furthermore, from the standpoint of resiliency, the researcher is skepti-
cal as to whether the statement that without a doubt, our Air Force is in a better
position to rapidly respond to disruptions in hydraulic component production [10] is
actually accurate due to the consolidation effort. As a rebuttal, the researcher would
postulate that the accuracy of the aforementioned statement is dependent upon the
nature of the disruption and the node(s) being affected, since capacity has effectively
been removed from the system.
This research seeks to determine the degree to which the design of a repair network
affects the ability of that network to respond to and recover from an unexpected dis-
ruption. The parameters which define the design of a repair network include density,
complexity, and node criticality [3]. Specifically, this research studies if integration
on an enterprise level would leverage greater benefits. The parameters which define
integration include visibility [3] and the ability of the system to laterally share ca-
pacity between nodes. This is achieved by shipping engines to repair nodes and/or to
bases requiring inventory based upon factors outlined in section 3.5 and section 3.6.
It is further postulated that the consolidation of repair capabilities retracts from,
rather than bolsters, the ability of a repair network to rapidly recover from disruption.
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In order to test these postulations, the F110-100 aircraft engine was selected to map
and test the resilience of the repair network due to its commonality as an asset utilized
by bases throughout the PACAF area of responsibility.
1.5 Thesis Overview
In Chapter 1, the foundational background of the research topic is provided, in-
cluding the motivation for the research, the current state of the U.S. Air Force supply
chain as it pertains to resiliency, along with the problem statement, research question,
and investigative questions.
In Chapter 2, relevant research is discussed, primarily from published articles and
books, and provides further insight and current frames of thought on the research
topic. The literature review begins with identifying the importance of resilient supply
chains, definitions of resiliency in this context, how it can be measured, and strategies
to improve a networks ability to cope with disruptions. Additionally, in Chapter 2,
gaps in the current research are identified, which are addressed within the context of
the intended contributions of this thesis.
In Chapter 3, the methodology utilized to conduct a quantitative analysis of the
degree to which resiliency has been designed into the F110-100 aircraft engine repair
network is outlined. The model of the system is constructed based upon the current
layout of the repair network, an identification of key variables needed to conduct the
analysis, the location of those data sources, and the design of the simulation.
In Chapter 4, the results of the simulations are analyzed based upon both the
current and integrated states of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network. Further-
more, statistical analyses are performed upon these outputs to determine comparative
results and gauge the degree to which resiliency has been designed into the current
network.
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In Chapter 5, the implications that this research has upon measuring the resiliency
of a network is discussed. Furthermore, the researcher provides recommendations
based upon the findings in order to improve the methodology used so that decision
makers could utilize it to enhance the robustness of the repair networks design. Re-
finement of this method could lead to an advancement in the U.S. Air Force’s ability
to provide rapid support to the warfighter despite supply chain or repair network
disruptions.
9
II. Literature Review
As organizations become increasingly globalized and business functions are out-
sourced, the flow of products, resources, information, and currency becomes longer
and more complex [6, 2]. The cumulative effect of these paradigms have increased the
vulnerability of supply chains and resulted in the inability of some firms to recover
from disruptions and its subsequent loss of customers, whereas others seem to pros-
per [6, 7, 2]. Those firms that find themselves poised to benefit from disruptions and
the inability of their competitors to cope with such events have done so through the
deliberate design of resiliency into their strategic business model [2]. The effective de-
sign of resiliency into a firms supply chain therefore becomes a competitive edge that
is not only necessary for short-term survival, but also to long-term competitiveness
[2]. However, before strategies that enhance resiliency can be employed, a thorough
understanding of what constitutes resiliency and the factors that effect it must first
be attained.
2.1 Supply Chain Resiliency
For the purpose of this research, resiliency, in both the context of supply chains
and repair networks, is defined as: The adaptive capability of a supply chain or
repair network to prepare for and/or respond to disruptions, to make a timely and
cost effective recovery, and therefore progress to a post-disruption state of operations
ideally, a better state than prior to the disruption.
As shown in Figure 2, the most significant amount of time is often consumed
within the preparation for recovery and recovery stage, during which the disruption
and its impacts are realized, the problem is communicated across various managerial
channels, and a decision is made as to how the recovery will be executed. This
10
research seeks to explore and quantitatively analyze the various strategies proposed
within current literature on how recovery time can be effectively reduced.
Figure 2. Stages of Disruption [2]
2.2 Strategies for Supply Chain Resiliency
Christopher and Peck [6] assert that there are four key principles in increasing
supply chain resilience, which include: (1) resilience can be built into a system in
advance of a disruption, (2) a high level of collaboration is required to identify and
manage risks, (3) agility is essential to react quickly to unforeseen events, and (4)
the culture of risk management is a necessity. From these principles and in concert
with a focus group research methodology, 14 unique capability factors were identified
which could be utilized to bolster supply chain resilience (see Table 1).
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Table 1. Capability Factors [6]
Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007) identified two cat-
egories of capabilities that moderate the severity of a supply chain disruption based
upon the design of the system: recovery and warning (see Figure 3). In order to ensure
the feasibility of this research, the scope will be limited to only recovery capabilities.
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Furthermore, this research will incorporate varying facets of design characteristics
into the analysis in order to determine both their baseline effects and the degree to
which recovery strategies can reduce the severity of their influence upon recovery
time.
Figure 3. Theoretical Relationship Between Design and Disruption Severity [3]
2.3 Recovery
The review of current literature on the topic has identified two overarching methods
for increasing supply chain resiliency in terms of recovery: redundancy and flexibility
[7, 2, 11]. Redundancy, which is the duplication of capacity [4], has been viewed in
terms of an insurance policy, whereby the benefits of such strategies remain unrealized
until the moment that a disruption occurs and is otherwise considered as a sheer cost
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[7, 11]. Redundancy involves the strategic and selective use of spare capacity, such as
additional tools or machinery, and inventory that can be invoked during a disruption
or in response to a variance in demand that surpasses the normal operating capacity
of the system [6].
Conversely, flexibility is advocated as the preferred method since its underlying
sub-strategies not only mitigate the likelihood and impact of a disruption, but also
provides the organization with low cost capabilities that enable the firm to capital-
ize upon fluctuations [6, 7, 12, 11]. Such methods include utilizing multiple supply
sources and transportation methods, holding emergency strategic stocks, employing
process standardization, postponing product differentiation, maintaining multiple lo-
cations with built-in interoperability, increasing supply visibility, and creating an
organizational culture that promotes resiliency [6, 7, 12, 11]. These strategies benefit
a system both during a disruption and in daily operations. Specifically, these ben-
efits include reserved capacity to meet increased demand, lead-time reduction, early
detection of disruptions, and increased forecast accuracy [6, 7, 12, 11]. Furthermore,
it is postulated that training maintenance personnel in more that one specialty field
could dampen the severity of a disruption by allowing supervision to restructure their
workforce and increase throughput by transferring the spare capacity from one shop
to another which is constrained. Flexibility, therefore, enables resources to be more
easily redeployed in order to subjugate constraints, which due to the nature of a
disruption, might not be able to be known in advance [4]. Flexibility is considered
preferable to redundancy due to its inherent ability to sense threats and respond
to them quickly, without the high costs associated with purchasing, holding, and
maintaining redundant resources [2].
Since many of the works conducted by authors such as Sheffi and Rice (2005),
Pettit Fiksel and Croxton (2010), Tang (2006) are conceptual in nature, they have
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advocated that future empirical and quantitative studies be conducted to explore the
effectiveness of such flexible strategies upon resiliency [7, 2, 11]. One particular study,
conducted by Petit, et al. (2010), has led to the creation of a framework that breaks
vulnerabilities and capabilities into distinct categories, allowing for an evaluation to
be made on the balancing the resources. This study too, however, recommends that
additional quantitative studies be conducted in order to measure the degree to which
various vulnerabilities and capabilities are linked [7]. The lack of quantitative analysis
on supply chain resiliency presents a distinct knowledge gap and this research seeks to
contribute to academia by providing a quantitative analysis of the effects that these
strategies and designs have upon the ability of a system to quickly recover from a
disruption. First, however, the literature must be explored further to identify possible
methods by which resiliency can be quantified and comparatively analyzed.
2.4 Supply Chain Resiliency Measures
To our knowledge, few methods have been proposed to measure supply chain re-
siliency. Multiple authors, such as Kleindorfer and Saad (2005), Wu, Backhurst, and
O’Grady (2007), Tang (2006), and Thun and Hoening (2011), conclude that no clear
consensus has been agreed upon regarding what should be analyzed for the effective
management of network disruptions. However, in those methods which are proposed,
measuring the performance level over time is a reoccurring theme [5, 2, 4].
One proposed measure of resilience is the area between the performance curve and
pre-disruption performance level, as shown in Figure 4. The corresponding area of a
successive disruption (Period B) can be compared to the area of the earlier disruption
(Period A) [4].
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Figure 4. Measuring Supply Chain Resiliency [4]
Similarly, Munoz and Dunbar (2015), identify multiple dimensions by which re-
siliency can be measured. As shown in Figure 5, these dimensions include: the time
that it takes to reach an acceptable recovery performance range, the severity that
the impact has upon performance, the total performance loss (area above the curve),
the length of the profile curve, and a time-dependent deviation-weighted sum to cap-
ture the speed and shape of the transient response. In addition to these measures,
Munoz and Dunbar (2015), provide equations that could be utilized to determine
each specific dimension of performance.
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Figure 5. Dimensions of Resilience [5]
In the first row of Figure 5, recovery time following a disruption is calculated as
the difference between the time at which the system has recovered (t2) and the at
which the lowest performance value is attained (t1). In the second row of Figure 5, the
severity of a disruption is calculated as the difference between the pre-disruption per-
formance level (p2) and the minimum performance level reached during a disruption
(p1).
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III. Methodology
This research fills gaps in the literature on supply chain resiliency by providing a
quantitative method for measuring the degree to which resiliency is designed into a
repair network. Furthermore, a comprehensive examination of the system’s variables
will provide key insights into the relative importance of each variable and its effect on
the repair networks resiliency, as measured by the time it takes to return to or exceed
the pre-disruption level of performance. It is also fathomable that a system, which
has little or an insufficient level of resiliency built into its design, may not recover
to its pre-disruption level of performance. If such an event were to occur, once the
new steady-state operating level was achieved, the system would be considered to be
recovered from the disruption.
The research methodology adopted in this research consists of the following steps:
1. Develop a conceptual design of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network in
PACAF that identifies the various nodes within the system and the current level of
interoperability between them.
2. Identify key variables that describe the repair process of the network at each
node (demand, capacity of both manpower and equipment, transportation times be-
tween nodes, unit repair times, etc.)
3. Identify database systems, which contain the required data previously identified,
gain access to those databases, and compile required data.
4. Create a simulation that models the conceptual F110-100 aircraft engine repair
network and incorporates the details and distributions identified by the previously
collected data.
5. Introduce a disruption into the model in order to gauge the degree to which the
repair network is affected.
6. Adjust the model to incorporate various resilient strategies identified during
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the literature review and gauge the degree to which the redesigned repair network is
affected by the same disruption.
7. Identify which system design strategies minimize the time required for the
system to return to or exceed the pre-disruption level of performance.
3.1 Developing a Conceptual Design
The basis of this research is centered around the actual and current design of F110-
100 aircraft engine repair network in PACAF. However, in order to protect sensitive
information, the numbers utilized in this simulation do not reflect the actual (real-
world) distribution of assets, resources, or repair node capabilities. As such, this
research can only be utilized as a proof of concept for the methodology and not as a
basis for evaluating the actual design of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network
in PACAF.
Utilizing Arena, a discrete event simulation software from Rockwell Automation,
a model of this repair network was created. It is assumed that in this current-
design model that each of the four PACAF bases are self-contained, in that they
only repair their own engines and once complete, return the repaired engine to its
own pool of spares. Later, this basic model will be expanded into a fully-integrated
network, whereby engines can be shipped laterally for repair and repaired spares are
sent to the base which need them the most. It is also important to note that this
model only considers Organizational level (O-level) repairs and does not account for
Intermediate level (I-level) or Depot level repairs. It is assumed that all engines are
repairable at the O-level and none of them are damaged to the point where they
require decommissioning (i.e., aircraft crash).
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3.2 System Description
In all of the models of the repair network, entities (engines) enter the system at the
onset of the simulation and arrive at time zero. Each base receives a predetermined
amount of entities, as shown in Table 2, which is a function of the number of aircraft
assigned to base and the number of spares authorized for each base:
Arrivalsi = NumberofAircraftAssignedi + NumberofSparesAuthorizedi (1)
where, NumberofAircraftAssignedi is the number of aircraft assigned to base i and
NumberofSparesAuthorizedi is the number of spare engines authorized to base i.
Table 2. Entity Arrivals
Base Number of Arrivals Arrival Time
Misawa 48 Instant
Osan 30 Instant
Kunsan 48 Instant
Eielson 30 Instant
Once the system is seeded with engines, each aircraft is loaded with a single engine.
The time to failure for each aircraft’s engine is normally distributed mean 180 days
and standard deviation 40 days (see Table 3). Since the number of entities which
enter the system at each base exceeds the number of aircraft, not all engines will be
initially loaded onto an aircraft. The remaining engines will be used as an inventory
of replacement engines. In Table 3, the number of aircraft, the authorized number of
spares, and the on-aircraft distribution-based time period for each base is listed.
Failed engines are repaired, however the engine failure mode is not explicitly mod-
eled. Engine repair times follow the triangular distribution and vary for each base (see
Table 4). Initiation of engine repairs require (1) a repair station and (2) a repair crew
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Table 3. Engine Utilization
Base Aircraft Spares Auth. Distribution Mean (days) Std Dev (days)
Misawa 40 8 Normal 180 40
Osan 25 5 Normal 180 40
Kunsan 40 8 Normal 180 40
Eielson 25 5 Normal 180 40
to be available. Each base as its own set of resources available in order to perform
repairs. Engines are repaired on a first come, first served basis. The amount of each
resource available to each base and its respective distribution for repair is shown in
Table 3.
After the engine is repaired, it acquires serviceable status and is transported to
the appropriate base’s engine inventory. In section 3.6, the method for determining
which base to stock is discussed.
3.3 Integration
Within the repair network, a decision must be made on where (1) engines can be
repaired and (2) where engines can be restocked. The following cases are considered:
1. Baseline: engines remain at their assigned base.
2. Back-end Integration: engines are repaired at their assigned base, but once repaired
can be shipped to another base to replenish inventory.
3. Fully-Integrated: engines can be shipped to another base for both repair and to
replenish inventory.
Table 4. Repair Location Capabilities
Base Crews Stations Distrib. Min (days) Mode (days) Max (days)
Misawa 2 2 Triangular 1 5 9
Osan 2 2 Triangular 1 5 9
Kunsan 2 2 Triangular 1 5 9
Eielson 2 2 Triangular 1 5 9
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3.4 Selection of Repair Location
For the decision of where to send an engine for repair, Equation 2 is utilized to
determine which base has the shortest (minimum) expected time to repair an engine
and return it to serviceability. This decision takes into account the current number
of engines in a base’s repair queue, the number of engines inbound to that base for
repair from other bases, the average queue waiting time per engine for that base’s
repair facility, and the distribution-based time to ship the engine from the originating
base to the repair base (note: this time equals zero when the repair base is also the
originating base). Specifically, the repair base is given by
RepairLocation = arg min
i
(((Ri +
∞∑
j=1
Sji) ∗Hi) + Tdji), (2)
where, Ri represents the number of engines in the repair queue for base i. Sji rep-
resents the number of engines being shipped from base j to base i for repair. Hi
represents the average waiting time that an engine spends in the repair queue for
base i. Tdji represents the distribution-based time that it takes to ship an engine
from originating base j to potential repair base i. Once again, Tdji equals zero when
i = j.
The distribution-based times that it takes to ship an engine from one base to
another is shown in Table 4.
Table 5. Engine Shipment Matrix
Base (from) Base (to) Distribution Min (days) Mode (days) Max (days)
Misawa Osan Triangular 1 3 5
Misawa Kunsan Triangular 1 3 5
Osan Kunsan Triangular 1 2 3
Osan Misawa Triangular 1 3 5
Kunsan Osan Triangular 1 2 3
Kunsan Misawa Triangular 1 3 5
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3.5 Deciding which Base to Stock
Once an engine has been repaired and considered serviceable, it enters a second
decision block which determines which base is in the greatest need of it. Specifically,
the replenishment location is given by
BasetoSendSpare = arg min
i
((Qi +
∞∑
j=1
Spji) −Wi), (3)
where, Qi represents the number of engines currently in the spares pool queue for
base i. Spji represents the number of engines being shipped from base j to base i for
serviceable spare stock. Wi represents the number of engines required by base i for
WRE purposes.
Equation 3 is utilized to determine which base is the furthest below or closest to
its WRE requirement. This equation enables the simulation to objectively compare
differences in a base’s authorized number of spares, since not all base’s are equally
resourced, and provides a means for cross-base comparison of current stock levels.
3.6 Simulation Setup
For this simulation, each model is first ran for a period of two years (730 days)
in order to establish a baseline measurement of performance. The length of this
simulation enabled adequate time for each model to reach steady state both before
and after the introduction of a disruption.
Furthermore, each model is replicated 200 times. In order to determine how many
replications to run, the integrated model was replicated 10 times. From those 10
replications, the standard deviation (SD) of the average number of serviceable engines
in the system for each replication was calculated. The estimated standard error (SE)
is given by
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SE =
√
SD2/R (4)
where, SE is the estimated standard error which is being calculated, SD is the stan-
dard deviation of the average number of serviceable engines for each replication, and
R is the number of replications utilized.
The standard deviation and number of replications were then substituted into
equation 4, in order to determine the standard error. The acceptable SE was deter-
mined to be 0.25 engines, which corresponded to a 200 replication requirement, in
order to achieve this level of precision.
3.7 Simulation Output
Results from the simulation were saved into a text output file containing the repli-
cation number, arrival time for each entity, and the current number of spares in
inventory for each replication.
3.8 Measuring Resiliency
In order to measure resiliency, three critical points must be identified for each repli-
cation’s output. These critical points are the time in which performance begins to
drop due to a disruption, the minimum performance value hit during the disruption,
and the time at which the system recovers from the disruption. However, the perfor-
mance level over time is highly variable and as such, the output must be smoothed
in order readily identify these critical points. As shown in Figure 6, by taking the
moving average over 50 time periods, a smooth plot (blue line) can be created which
makes the identification of the critical points more apparent.
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Figure 6. Example of Performance Smoothing
Once smoothed, an algorithm is utilized to determine the critical points. The
algorithm, as denoted in Appendix B, looks for the points in which the derivative of
the performance line goes from positive to negative (onset of a disruption), back to
positive (system begins to recover), and back to negative again (system has surpassed
its point of recovery). Using these critical points, the recovery time can be calculated
by determining the delta between the time at which the system recovers from the
disruption and the time in which performance begins to drop due to a disruption.
A smaller delta would signify a shorter recovery period and thus a greater degree of
resiliency built into that model as compared to a model with a larger delta.
Additionally, the severity of the disruption for each model is measured by com-
paring the minimum performance value reached. Furthermore, these measures could
also be utilized to determine which strategies have the most influence on increasing
resiliency. For instance, once a model of a system has been created, all but one vari-
able can be held constant during several iterations of introducing a disruptive event.
A measurement of the impact that the variable had upon the severity and recovery
time could then be realized and compared against the effect that other strategies had
upon performance. Such an analysis would be useful in determining which variable(s)
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decision makers should focus upon in order to increase resiliency in the most effective,
efficient, and cost conscientious manner.
3.9 Model Performance Measurement Without a Disruption
In order to measure and compare the performance of each model without a dis-
ruption, a Matlab algorithm was created to capture the average part level (number of
serviceable engines available) for each replication (see Appendix A). A histogram was
then created for each model that shows the distribution of these average part levels,
which can then be compared against other models (see Figure 7 in the Results and
Analysis section).
3.10 Disruptive Events
After running each model without a disruption in order to gauge baseline per-
formance, a planned disruption was introduced into each of the three models at a
simulation time of 365 days. This allowed enough time for the systems to reach
steady state prior to the disruption occurring. At the time of disruption, one node
(Misawa) loses its entire capability to repair engines for a period of 100 days. The
length of this disruption allowed for a clear visual degradation in the system’s per-
formance. At the end of the disruption (simulation time of 465 days), the affected
node’s repair capability is restored in full to its pre-disruption level.
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IV. Results and Analysis
In determining the answer to investigative question 1 (IQ1), this research found
that at the O-level of repair, F110-100 aircraft engines within PACAF are repaired
only by the base at which they are assigned. As such, engines are not shipped to
other repair nodes based upon capacity and/or workload.
As discussed in the background, integration of the repair network is achieved via
coordination on telecoms between each node and the item managers and weapon
system teams at PACAF in order to solve specific problems once they have been
identified. There is however, no capacity that is being utilized laterally between nodes
as denoted in the answer to IQ1. This design was incorporated into the baseline model
of the simulation and satisfies IQ2.
As it applies to IQ3, in order to simulate PACAF’s F110-100 aircraft engine repair
network, data must be gathered on how many engines are assigned to each node,
the distribution by which they require repairs, the distribution by which each node
performs repairs, the repair resources allocated to each node, and the distributions
for transportation times between nodes.
The aforementioned datasets were pulled from the Logistics, Installations and Mis-
sion Support-Enterprise View (LIMS-EV) system. The Engine and Repair Network
sections allow the user to search for these data sets for various nodes over a specified
time period. Transportation times between nodes, however, are not available through
LIMS-EV and must be gathered from the SCOW. As such, in response to IQ4, LIMS-
EV and the SCOW posses the data required to simulate the current and integrated
states of the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network.
As shown in Figure 7, analysis of the simulation results indicate that the integration
of repair nodes at the O-level decreased, rather than increased, the overall number
of spare engines available to the system. This finding satisfies IQ5, which seeks to
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determine the effects that integration of repair facilities has upon the overall number
of spare engines available to the system. Unfortunately, this result is counter to the
expected outcome, as integration should only help and not hinder the performance
of a network. As such, it is clear that the decision logic used to determine where
and when to ship and engine for both repair and restocking of inventory is either
incomplete or sub-optimal. This concern will be discussed further in the limitations
and recommendations for future research sections.
Figure 7. Model Part Level Performance without Disruption
Of the three models originally developed, there was no statistically significant
28
improvement noted from integration once a disruption was introduced (see Figure
8). In fact, once again, the back-end integrated model performed significantly worse
than both the baseline and fully-integrated designs. This reaffirms the previously
discussed finding that the decision logic used to determine where and when to ship
and engine for both repair and restocking of inventory requires refinement in order
for this method to be useful to decision makers. However, the results do illustrate
the significant impact that poor decision making in network design could have upon
its ability to recover from a disruption. As shown in the last column in Figure 8, the
recovery time for various network designs can be calculated, which satisfies IQ6.
In order to ensure that the distribution of transportation times were not the cause
of the poor performance by integrated designs, they were eliminated from the simu-
lation. In essence, engines could instantly be transported from one base to another
for both repair and/or inventory replenishment. As shown in Figure 8, removing
transportation times only resulted in a slight improvement in part level and recovery
time. As such, transportation times could be ruled out as the reason for the poor
performance of the integrated designs. This result does however suggest that reducing
transportation times between nodes could provide some benefit to the networks level
of resiliency.
Next, the capacity available to the fully-integrated and baseline models was dou-
bled in order to gauge the impact that it would have upon resiliency. As shown in
Figure 8, both models showed a respective increase in part level and reduction in
recovery time. This result suggests that adding redundancy to system does have a
clear impact on improving resiliency.
As previously discussed, the impact that integration has upon mitigating the sever-
ity of a disruption could not be clearly identified, which only partially answers IQ7.
As discussed in section 4.1, the decision logic utilized for engine shipment will need
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Figure 8. Resiliency Performance Measures with Disruption
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to be refined in order to show the benefit that integration could present. However,
once again, the results do illustrate the significant impact that poor decision making
in network design could have upon its ability to recover from a disruption.
4.1 Limitations
Inventory Decision Logic
As shown in the results and analysis section, the integrated models failed to per-
form better than the baseline model in terms of increasing the number of spares
available and minimizing recovery time. Unfortunately, this result is counter to the
expected outcome, as integration should only help and not hinder the performance
of a network. As such, it is clear that the decision logic used to determine where
and when to ship and engine for both repair and restocking of inventory is either
incomplete or sub-optimal. Further research will need to be conducted in order to
identify an effective and optimal decision logic so that the value of integration can be
identified. Instead, this research only shows the significant impact that poor network
design could have upon its ability to recover from a disruption.
Identifying Critical Performance Points
As shown in figure 9, Munoz and Dunbar [5] identified four types of of performance
profiles: (a) linear, (b) concave, (c) convex, and (d) non-specific, non-linear behaviors.
The critical points outlined in section 3.10 can be easily identified by the algorithm
shown in Appendix E for all of these types with the exception of non-specific, non-
linear behaviors. Since the derivative of the non-specific, non-linear performance
profile will change between positive and negative direction more than three times, the
algorithm was unable to accurately determine the critical points outlined in section
3.10. As such, replications that had a non-specific, non-linear performance profile were
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discarded. Further research will need to be conducted in order to create an effective
algorithm that can accurately identify these critical points for any performance profile.
Figure 9. Typology of Performance Profiles [5]
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V. Discussion
This research provides a comparative method for evaluating the effects that vari-
ous network designs have upon performance during a disruption and recovery time.
This is accomplished by demonstrating how resiliency can be measured and that the
benefit from various resilient strategies can be compared. Furthermore, this research
illustrates the significant impact that poor decision making in network design and
decision logic could have upon its ability to mitigate the severity of and recover from
an unanticipated disruption.
5.1 Problem Statement Resolution
As stated in section 1.1, decision makers at the AFSC need to know: (1) the
degree of vulnerability that the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network construct is
to disruptions, (2) how long it would take to resume steady-state operations following
an unexpected, disruptive event, and (3) what strategies can be employed in order to
reduce both the severity of a disruption and the time it takes to recover from it.
In response to research question 1, this research tested the degree of vulnerability
that the F110-100 aircraft engine repair network construct is to a specific disruption,
namely the temporary loss of throughput at a single node. Although this method
does allow for the testing and comparison of other variables, such as the effect of
various mitigation capabilities, a much more robust approach would include varying
where a disruption occurs, its duration, and its area of effect. Due to this limitation,
the severity of this one particular disruption can be gauged as factor of the networks
design. The first column in Figure 8 shows the degree of vulnerability (severity) that
a particular design is to the selected disruption. From this figure, an inference can be
drawn that of the capabilities tested, increasing capacity provides the greatest benefit
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to reducing severity.
In response to research question 2, the second column in Figure 8 shows the recov-
ery time that a particular design has to the selected disruption. For this particular
disruption, an inference can be drawn that of the capabilities tested, increasing ca-
pacity provides the greatest benefit to reducing recovery time.
From these findings, research question 3 can easily be addressed, as this method
enables the direct comparison of mitigating capabilities. This research tested the
effects that network design capabilities such as integration, reduced transportation
times, and increasing capacity, has upon the resiliency of a network. Once again, it
appears that increasing capacity provides the greatest benefit to both dimensions of
resiliency (severity and recovery time).
However, since research question 1 and 2 were not fully satisfied, a more robust
approach would include varying where a disruption occurs, its duration, and its area
of effect.
5.2 Significance of Findings
Although this research does not analyze the effect that different types of disruptions
has upon a network, it does clearly provide a means by which resilience can be
measured and the performance of multiple design prospects compared against each
other. Furthermore, this research bridges the gap in literature between the theory
of how resilience can be measured, which strategies poses the greatest potential to
mitigate a disruption, and a quantitative analysis that actually tests those theories.
As such, the importance of this research lies in its findings that this research does
serve as a proof of concept in that resiliency can be measured and that the benefit
from various resilient strategies can be weighed. Furthermore, this research does
illustrate the significant impact that poor decision making in network design and
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decision logic could have upon its ability to mitigate the severity of and recover from
an unanticipated disruption.
5.3 Managerial Implications
As it applies specifically to decision makers at AFSC, this method can be used
to compare the performance of proposed design changes to a repair network. In the
background, section 1.4, the SCP was identified by AFSC as a possible candidate for
redesign. Proposed alternative designs can be evaluated and compared against the
current design to determine both the levels of performance and the degree to which
resiliency is incorporated into each respective design. Additionally, by keeping severity
and recovery time as two separate dimensions in the measure of resilience, as this
method does, enables decision makers to quickly and easily discern the results. Both
the part level and recovery time metrics are easily understood and each paint a specific
and valuable picture, unlike methods which combine the two measures. For example,
if this research utilized the area above the curve method for calculating resilience,
then the output would be in engine-days. Such a unit of measure is convoluted, as
it masks the true shape of the disruption in terms of the performance curve and it
provides little useful description of the behavior of the network.
The method utilized in this research allows the decision makers at AFSC to base
their selection of which design to implement upon a quantitative comparison, rather
than ”gut feel” or cost alone. Although cost should be a factor in determining which
design to implement, it must be balanced against capability. Future recommendations
based upon this notion will be discussed in the next section.
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5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
It is recommended that future studies conduct quantitative research on the effect
that various capabilities factors have upon resiliency in order to further bridge the
identified gaps in literature. Specifically, the following research questions can be
explored in greater depth in order to further this research and expand upon the
understanding of resiliency:
What are the effects that various inventory decision policies have upon
the performance of a network?
As shown by the research, decision policies could have a wide range of effects
upon the performance of a network and its ability to recover from a disruptive event.
Therefore, it is recommended that further studies be conducted in order to determine
which variables should be considered when integrating a network and how decision
logic can be improved to ensure enhanced system performance.
To what degree do various strategies affect resiliency and which provide
the greatest benefit to cost ratio?
Although this research tests to see the impact that capacity, integration, and
transportation times have upon resiliency, there are many more capability factors, as
identified in figure 3, that can and should be analyzed. Furthermore, the benefits from
implementing each capability factor should be weighed against the cost required to
implement it. From such an analysis, the researcher could determine which strategies
have the greatest benefit to cost ratio. As such, this investigation could prove useful
to decision makers who wish to bolster the resiliency of their networks given a limited
budget.
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How should resources and capabilities be spread across a repair network
during wartime in order to ensure system resiliency?
The notion of adaptive basing has become quite popular in the U.S. Air Force as
a means to ensure continued operations in a contested environment. However, little
quantitative research has been conducted on how to best disperse limited assets and
resources in order to balance combat effectiveness and survivability. The methodology
presented in this research can be modified to compare the performance of a network
based upon various dispersion plans. Furthermore, given a particular dispersion plan,
the effects that an attack (or disruption) on various nodes would have upon the
performance of the system could be analyzed.
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Appendix A. Matlab Code for Identifying Moving Average
Part Level
num_rep = max(Rep);
AvgPL=[];
StdPL=[];
for i = 1:num_rep
PL = PartLevel(Rep==i);
AvgPL(i) = nanmean(PL);
StdPL(i) = nanstd(PL, 1);
end
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Appendix B. Matlab Code for Identifying Critical Points
num_rep = max(Rep);
MA_data = [];
Crit_t = [];
KeyMeasures=[];
for i = 1:num_rep
T = Time(Rep==i);
PL = PartLevel(Rep==i);
nT = numel(T);
dT = T - [0;T(1:nT-1)];
k = 50;
MA_PL=zeros(size(T));
for t = 1:nT-k
MA_PL(t) = sum(dT(t:t+k-1).*PL(t:t+k-1))/sum(dT(t:t+k-1));
end
dMA_PL = MA_PL - [0;MA_PL(1:nT-1)];
dMA_PLsmoothed = movmean(dMA_PL(1:nT-k),5);
t_start = find(T >350 & T < 375);
t_end = find(T > 580 & T < 600);
crit_t = [];
c = 0;
d = 2;
x=0;
[min_MA_PL, t_min0] = min(MA_PL(t_start(1):t_end(1)));
t_min = t_min0+t_start(1);
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crit_t(1) = 0;
crit_t(2) = T(t_min);
for j = t_min:numel(dMA_PLsmoothed)-1
if (dMA_PLsmoothed(j)>0 && dMA_PLsmoothed(j+1)<0)&&
(T(j)-T(t_min) > 50)
d= d+1;
crit_t(d)=T(j);
end
end
min_MA_PL = min(MA_PL(t_start(1):t_end(1)));
pre_dis_MA_PL = nanmean(MA_PL(t_start(1)-50:t_start(1)));
post_dis_MA_PL = nanmean(MA_PL(t_end(1):nT-k));
MA_rep_data = [T(1:nT-k),MA_PL(1:nT-k), movmean(dMA_PL(1:nT-k),5)];
MA_data = [MA_data;[repmat(i,nT-k,1), MA_rep_data]];
Crit_t = [Crit_t;[repmat(i,numel(crit_t),1),crit_t’]];
if(numel(crit_t)>2)
KeyMeasures = [KeyMeasures; [i, pre_dis_MA_PL, min_MA_PL,
post_dis_MA_PL, T(t_min), crit_t(3)-T(t_min)]];
end
end
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Appendix C. Matlab Code for Graphing Simulation Outputs
num_rep = max(Rep);
for i = 1:num_rep
T = MA_data(MA_data(:,1)==i,2);
T2 = Time(Rep==i);
PL = PartLevel(Rep==i);
MA_PL = MA_data(MA_data(:,1)==i,3);
dMA_smoothed = MA_data(MA_data(:,1)==i,4);
crit_t = Crit_t(Crit_t(:,1)==i,2);
clf
scatter(T, MA_PL);
hold;
scatter(T2, PL)
scatter(T, dMA_smoothed*10);
scatter(crit_t, repmat(5, size(crit_t)));
system(’pause’)
clf
end
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